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Is Uber a Common Carrier?  
KEVIN WERBACH* 
 The title of this essay may seem surprising.  What does Uber, a 
transportation service considered an exemplar of the “sharing 
economy,” have to do with Internet regulation? What does common 
carriage, a regulatory construct most commonly associated with 
railroads in the nineteenth century and telephones in the twentieth 
century, have to do with Uber? Also, why does the answer even 
matter?  These are precisely the sort of questions we should ponder if 
we truly care about the future of Internet regulation. 
 Twenty years after the privatization of the network backbone and 
the birth of the commercial web, the world has changed. The Internet 
is no longer just a communications network to move digital bits. Its 
most significant manifestations involve reshaping markets and social 
relationships in the physical world. These “Internet-enabled” services 
use digital and mobile connectivity to coordinate the distribution of 
resources, such as transportation services and lodging. The scale of 
such online/offline hybrids, including Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and 
Lyft, now frequently exceeds that of their long-established 
competitors.  Additionally, their influence on basic social functions, 
such as transportation and housing, promises to be even more 
significant than their financial impact. 
 In such an environment, we must look at regulation differently. It 
makes little sense to enforce a strict separation between the cyber 
world and the physical world when firms increasingly straddle both.  
Moving beyond the rhetoric of regulatory obligations primarily as 
limitations to be overcome, the positive value of public policy to 
stimulate investment and innovation should be disinterred. Notions of 
common carriage and public utilities, once unmoored from their 
historical associations with sanctioned monopolies and rate 
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regulation, can function as framing devices for the regulatory 
questions of the twenty years to come. Increasingly, their application 
will be to companies that operate over the network, rather than to just 
connectivity providers. 
 This essay explores a future of Internet regulation that draws on 
the valuable attributes of longstanding doctrines to craft a viable 
regime for the future. Part I describes the rise of Internet-enabled 
network services, with Uber as the paradigmatic case. Part II explains 
how these services function as utilities and identifies the major 
regulatory conflict points. Part III speculates on how these issues may 
be resolved.   
INTERNET-ENABLED NETWORK SERVICES 
 Uber, launched in 2010 as an aggregator of “black car” services in 
San Francisco, has quickly become one of the world’s most influential 
companies.1  Startups pitch venture capitalists on “the Uber for x,” as 
they once talked of imitating Amazon.com or Google.2 Moreover, 
investors have thrown money at the startup at an unprecedented pace.  
Worth over $50 billion as of mid-2015, Uber is the world’s most 
highly-valued, venture-backed private company.3 It now operates in 
over 300 cities worldwide and has over one million drivers in its 
network.4 Uber’s revenues are already in the billions of dollars and 
may hit $10 billion in 2015.5   
1 See Kara Swisher, Man and Uber Man, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2014, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/12/uber-travis-kalanick-controversy. 
2 See Erin Griffith, The Problem With "Uber for X", FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2015/08/11/uber-profitable-business-model/; Adrienne Lafrance, The 
Web Is the Real World, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 22, 2014, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/12/the-web-is-the-real-
world/383985/; Jason Gilbert, Poem: There's an Uber for X, QUARTZ, Dec. 12, 2014, 
http://qz.com/311217/poem-theres-an-uber-for-x/. 
3 See Edward Moyer, Uber to be Valued at $50 Billion in New Funding Round, Say 
Reports, CNET, May 9, 2015, http://www.cnet.com/news/uber-to-be-valued-at-50-billion-
in-new-funding-round-say-reports/.  
4 See Luz Lazo, Uber turns 5, reaches 1 million drivers and 300 cities worldwide. Now 
what?, WASH. POST, June 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-
gridlock/wp/2015/06/04/uber-turns-5-reaches-1-million-drivers-and-300-cities-
worldwide-now-what/. 
5 See Alyson Shontell, LEAKED: Internal Uber Deck Reveals Staggering Revenue And 
Growth Metrics, BUSINESS INSIDER, Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-
revenue-rides-drivers-and-fares-2014-11. As a private company, Uber does not report 
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 The excitement about Uber reflects the awe-inspiring scope of its 
potential. In early 2015, Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick, revealed that the 
company’s annual revenues in San Francisco ($500 million) were 
more than triple the size of the taxi industry in the city ($140 million), 
and still rapidly growing.6  This indicates that the company is not just 
beating established competitors, but creating significant new demand 
by expanding the ride-sharing market. Uber is now exploring entirely 
new market opportunities, such as delivery,7 and developing self-
driving car technology, 8 suggesting an ambition far beyond the taxi 
market.  
 Uber is the most prominent example of a deeply important trend.  
However, it is widely misunderstood.  Descriptions of Uber and its 
competitors usually lump them as examples of “the Sharing Economy” 
or “Collaborative Consumption” because they encourage private 
drivers to share their cars with paying passengers on an on-demand 
basis, or the descriptions focus on the functionality of its smartphone-
based, ride-hailing app.9  While these descriptions have some validity, 
they miss the larger picture.  At its core, Uber is an Internet-enabled 
network utility. 
 The critical aspect of Uber is that it provides a broad-scale service, 
involving physical assets, that is seamlessly enabled by network 
connectivity.  In the words of early Facebook executive Matt Cohler, 
                                                                                                                   
detailed financial information. These numbers are based on selective information the 
company has disclosed in the past, plus leaked investor presentation materials.  
6 See Henry Blodget, Uber CEO Reveals Mind-Boggling New Statistic That Skeptics Will 
Hate, BUSINESS INSIDER, Jan. 19, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-
san-francisco-2015-1. 
7 See Douglas Macmillan, The $50 Billion Question: Can Uber Deliver?, WALL ST. J., June 
15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-50-billion-question-can-uber-deliver-
1434422042. 
8 See Andrew J. Hawkins, Google vs. Uber and the Race to Self-Driving Taxis, THE VERGE, 
Dec. 16, 2015, http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/16/10309960/google-vs-uber-
competition-self-driving-cars.  
9 See generally Raj Kapoor, Lessons From the Sharing Economy, TECHCRUNCH, Aug. 30, 
2014, http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/30/critical-lessons-from-the-sharing-economy/; 
The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-
sharing-economy; Russell Belk, You are what you can access: Sharing and collaborative 
consumption online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595 (2014); Jeremiah Owyang, Infographic: A Day in 
the Life of the Collaborative Economy, COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/09/29/a-day-in-the-life-of/version1-2.   
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Uber is “a remote control for real life.”10 To its users, those one million 
drivers and their automobiles around the world are poised to appear 
in minutes at the touch of a smartphone screen, just like web pages in 
a Google search or music on Spotify.  Uber is the invisible platform 
that provides an essential service, on demand and at scale, analogous 
to water, electric, and telecommunications providers.   
 Uber is the largest, most controversial, and best known of the 
Internet-enabled utilities. It has attracted tremendous attention and 
raised a host of policy challenges, so I use it throughout this section as 
the exemplar of the category. Uber, however, is far from the only 
company using smartphones or networked sensors to reconfigure 
major industries through utility platforms,11 nor is it the only service 
to generate massive revenues and achieve a shockingly high valuation: 
Peer-to-peer lodging service Airbnb was valued by investors at $20 
billion in early 2015.12  
 Without the Internet, such services would require the kind of 
direct hierarchical management used in earlier transportation systems 
such as trains, airplanes, or express delivery companies.  The U.S. 
Postal Service can get your package to you because it employs the 
drivers and owns the trucks. Uber does neither (at least, not yet).13  
 
 
 
 
10 See Swisher, supra note 1. 
11 The brand council, Crowd Companies, has identified over 500 funded Sharing Economy 
companies. See Jeremiah Owyang, Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2 — Watch it 
Grow, CROWDCOMPANIES (Dec. 14, 2014), http://crowdcompanies.com/blog/collaborative-
economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/.  
12 See Ingrid Lunden, Airbnb is Raising a Monster Round at a $20B Valuation, 
TECHCRUNCH, Feb. 27, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/27/airbnb-2/; Sarah 
Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win Over 
Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-
sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/. There are a limited number of markets 
capable of generating the scale of revenues that Uber and Airbnb have achieved, and the 
dynamics of network effects and platform competition suggest the “winner take all” 
division of market share they are demonstrating is likely to continue.  As a result, there will 
ultimately be a relatively small number of massive players, just as there are today in 
traditional utility markets. 
13 Uber’s legal relationship with its drivers is under challenge. Uber claims they are 
independent contractors, but two lawsuits assert they should be classified as employees.  
See Rachel Emma Silverman, Uber, Lyft Cases Focus on Drivers’ Legal Status, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-lyft-cases-could-help-clarify-drivers-
legal-status-1426456519; Tom Risen, Employee or Contractor? Uber Ruling Could Affect 
Other Companies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/18/employee-or-contractor-uber-ruling-
could-affect-other-companies. 
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Instead, Uber uses smartphones in the hands of drivers and 
customers, connected through the Internet, to tie together 
independently-operated vehicles into a mass of transportation 
resources. Using Uber makes it seem as though there is an 
undifferentiated pool of cars available for use at whatever moment 
they are needed, similar to the pool of electricity, natural gas, or water 
going into a home or business. 
 The main difference between Uber and traditional utilities is that 
it does not own or operate its own network; it functions as a cloud 
service on top of the existing mobile Internet fabric. Uber and its 
customers both rely on wireless data networks to communicate, but 
Uber does not control, manage, or financially benefit from their data 
transport services. Uber leverages those connectivity utilities to 
provide its functionality; hence the term “Internet-enabled.” Where 
broadband access providers such as AT&T and Verizon deliver digital 
connectivity as a networked resource, Uber delivers transportation 
capacity.   
 To a network engineer, Uber is no different from a web-hosting 
company such as Netflix. These are applications and services on top of 
the network, and, under the end-to-end approach to networking, their 
particular needs should be excluded from consideration in network 
design.14  This separation of regulated, lower-level connectivity from 
unregulated, higher-level services or content is a hallmark of modern 
communications policy.  However, there is an important corollary to 
the layered vision of networks. The lower-level protocols can ignore 
the particularities of the higher-level applications, but, equally 
important, those higher-level applications can ignore the complexities 
of the infrastructure.15  From the perspective of Uber’s users and 
partners, Uber is the network.  Addressing the concerns at the 
connectivity layer below does not guarantee an innovative, fair, and 
competitive market on top.  
 
 
 
 
14 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Kevin 
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH-TECH L. 37 
(2002).  Not all scholars agree that the end-to-end model implies that broadband providers 
should be prohibited from combining layers to optimize services. See Christopher S. Yoo, 
Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006).     
15 This is not strictly true. Content delivery networks (CDNs) and other forms of traffic 
engineering come into play for large-scale services, especially those requiring low latency 
or high reliability.  For the kinds of utility services described in this essay, however, such 
complexities are generally not necessary. 
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 Appropriately, when states and localities create new legal 
categories for services such as Uber, they typically do not call them 
taxi or transportation providers. They are generally labeled in these 
new statutes as “transportation network companies” (TNCs).16 The 
same could be said about Internet-enabled utilities in other industries. 
Facebook is called a social-network company.  Airbnb could, 
equivalently, be described as a lodging-network company. TaskRabbit 
or Homejoy could be called people-networking companies for 
“handyman” and cleaning tasks. Nest (now part of Google), which 
makes smart thermostats and similar devices, is a home-automation-
network company. Amazon.com, through its Amazon web services, is 
a cloud-network company.  All of these companies—and many 
others—provide services that aggregate pools of physical resources 
through Internet connectivity. 
 Internet-enabled utilities could not exist until recently. They 
depend not just on the existence of Internet connectivity (as do Google 
and Amazon.com), or its ubiquity (as does Facebook), or broadband 
(as does Netflix), or on mobile data connectivity (as do Twitter or 
Instagram).  They generally require widespread penetration of 
smartphones, plus a cloud-computing infrastructure, ancillary 
services such as payments and mapping, and the software engineering 
techniques of Big Data.  They often require a comfort level about the 
associated human interactions, such as a willingness to step into a car 
not driven by a licensed taxi driver or to stay in a stranger’s private 
residence—opportunities that did not exist a decade ago. These 
associated human interactions are hurdles that companies like Uber 
had to overcome, just as comfort with using credit cards online was an 
earlier barrier to e-Commerce.  All of these factors have come together 
in recent years to allow Internet-enabled utilities to grow with 
stunning rapidity.   
PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE NEW UTILITIES 
 The category of Internet-enabled utilities is still new and rapidly 
evolving. It has reached a level of significance, however, that can no 
longer be ignored in public policy discussions.  We may still be 
16 See, e.g., California Public Utilities Commission, Decision Adopting Rules And 
Regulations To Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants To The Transportation 
Industry, Rulemaking 12-12-011 (July 30, 2013), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K112/77112285.PDF; 
Illinois Transportation Network Providers Act, 625 ILCS 57, available at  
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3589&ChapterID=49. 
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fighting in ten years about network neutrality for broadband providers 
and privacy restrictions for advertising-funded services, but those are 
not the emerging issues of the future.  Instead, Internet-enabled 
utilities will be the locus of foundational regulatory debates in the 
coming years. 
 The past and present of Internet regulation focuses on four main 
categories of activity: online content (e.g., YouTube), online services 
(e.g., Facebook, Google, and Twitter), electronic commerce (e.g., 
Amazon.com), and communications networks (e.g., AT&T and 
Comcast). While there is certainly no shortage of ongoing 
controversies in these areas, the basic regulatory approach in each 
category is fairly well established. The debates and fault lines are, by 
now, familiar.   
 The future is more uncertain.  Renting a room in someone’s 
apartment through Airbnb is not the same kind of interaction as 
ordering a book on Amazon.com or posting a video to YouTube. The 
user must deal not just with the digital platform provider, but also 
with the individuals and assets the provider aggregates and connects. 
It is conceivable, though also problematic, to ignore the digital glue 
and treat the physical endpoints as the “real” aspects of the service.  
Doing so naturally emphasizes their particular industry sectors over 
the common factor of Internet-enabled market making. Ultimately, 
though, the most significant and difficult public policy questions these 
platforms raise derive from their digital attributes.  
WHAT MAKES A UTILITY? 
 The term “utility” in the label for Uber and related services is not 
an accident.  The best way to find regulatory models for this emerging 
class of powerful platforms is to look to the way public utilities are 
treated.   
 What actually makes something a “utility”? There is great 
confusion about the term.17  The most familiar examples of utilities are 
public and partially-public services such as electricity and water.18 A 
17 See Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761 (2010).  The use of the term 
is often circular.   
18 See COLUM. ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2015) (“[I]ndustry required by law to 
render adequate service in its field at reasonable prices to all who apply for it. Public 
utilities frequently operate as monopolies in their market. In the United States, public 
utilities are most commonly involved in the business of supplying consumers with water, 
electricity, telephone, natural gas, and other necessary services.”); WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF AMERICAN LAW 173 (2d ed. 1998) (“Public utilities are businesses that provide the public 
with necessities, such as water, electricity, natural gas, and telegraph communication.”). 
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utility, however, can be a private company that is not limited to a 
defined set of services.  Since the FCC was created in 1934, telephone 
networks have been regulated in the United States as utilities, even 
though they are privately-operated and deliver technologically novel 
communications services.  The rules governing AT&T are not the same 
as those governing electric and natural gas providers, nor are they 
identical to those covering other historical utility-like networks, such 
as trains and stagecoaches. There are, however, commonalities among 
all those systems, and among their regulatory treatment.   
 Economists generally define utilities as services with large sunk 
costs, economies of scale, and massive consumption.19  This is a rather 
capacious category. It is important to note that the rationale for utility 
treatment need not include status as a monopoly, or the legally-
enforced exclusive franchises that pre-divestiture AT&T and early 
cable television systems enjoyed. Moreover, while legal regimes 
governing utilities go back many years, significantly more recent (and 
generally less intrusive) laws also bear traces of the same 
categorization.    
 At the root of utility treatment is the determination, going back at 
least to the 1876 case of Munn v. Illinois in American jurisprudence, 
that not all private companies operate in the same relationship to the 
public interest.20  Certain industries and firms produce both greater 
potential benefits and larger potential harms to cherished social and 
economic values.  As a result, despite some inconsistency in their 
rationales, courts allowed legislatures to impose special obligations on 
(and provide special benefits to) those companies. 
19 See Pablo T. Spiller & Mariano Tommasi, The Institutions of Regulation: An Application 
to Public Utilities, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 515, 519 (Claude 
Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); Rick Geddes, Public Utilities, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1162 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
20 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 153 (1876).  See Werbach, supra note 15; Oren Bracha & 
Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, And Accountability In The 
Law Of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1175 (2008) (“When a private party occupies an 
extraordinary position of power that makes it indispensable to others for obtaining certain 
important resources, goods, or services, and when alternatives are very limited, 
traditionally there has been more receptiveness to the application of fairness and 
accountability norms.”). 
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In general terms, utilities share several characteristics: 
x Societally significant markets 
Functions such as energy, plumbing, 
communications, housing, and transportation 
are baseline requirements for members of a 
modern society.  They are either necessary for a 
minimal standard of living or essential for full-
fledged participation in the economy and as a 
citizen.  This list is not static. It changes over 
time with the advance of technology and 
changes in society. Telephone connections and, 
increasingly, broadband and mobile Internet 
access are newer additions to the list.   
x “Connection” infrastructure 
Utilities are networks that knit together local 
connections into integrated service systems.  
They function as platforms that link users to 
each other or to other communities of 
providers.  The importance of utilities is 
magnified because they occupy this role. 
x Tendency toward monopolies 
The public policy significance of utilities arises 
not only from their importance and structure, 
but also because of their tendency toward 
market failure.  With significant fixed costs and 
typically strong network effects, utilities 
services are not easily delivered through 
competitive markets. This fact, combined with 
utilities’ status as connective infrastructure, 
gives them the ability and incentives to leverage 
their bottleneck control in ways that can 
significantly harm competition and innovation. 
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x Personal information via data exhaust 
Finally, utilities automatically collect personal 
information through their processes of 
operation, and that “data exhaust” has 
significant potential for misuse.  All major 
digital systems raise significant privacy 
questions, but utilities are particularly 
dangerous in this regard. They must collect 
information through the course of their 
operations. For example, a telephone company 
knows the origin and destination of every call a 
user is involved with, and mobile 
communications companies know a user’s 
physical location in real time.  How those 
companies may leverage that data is subject to 
regulation, but the fact they obtain it is 
inevitable. 
 Under these criteria, Internet-enabled network services bear many 
of the indicia of utilities.  Uber, for example, provides transportation 
functionality that could be, for many, essential to daily life (especially 
where it reaches a scale that displaces competing forms of 
transportation in local areas). It stitches together a virtual network of 
riders, drivers, mapping, payments, and other functions into an 
integrated platform. Though the market is still developing, Uber has a 
dominant share in most cities where it operates, with both traditional 
taxi operators and smaller rivals such as Lyft struggling to maintain 
footholds.  It also collects extensive information about riders’ 
locations and activities as an outgrowth of its business.  
 These factors alone do not mean that Uber is harming the public 
interest or even that it has reached a sufficient scale to justify 
regulatory scrutiny. They simply imply that Uber can be accurately 
classed as a utility, which is the starting point, rather than the 
endpoint, for regulatory analysis.  Other Internet-enabled networked 
services have similar attributes. 
UTILITY REGULATION 
 One of the signal attributes of utilities is their regulatory status.  
As previously noted, utilities are firms that are, in the language of 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century jurisprudence, “affected with a 
public interest.”21  In some cases, utilities are operated by 
governments or other public authorities, but they can also be 
organized as private, for-profit firms. In those latter cases, the public 
significance of the utilities is addressed through special regulatory 
benefits and obligations.  These can take many different forms based 
on the market sector and structure.  
 The past several decades have witnessed a dramatic shift from top-
down regulation of economic activity toward approaches focused on 
competition and market forces.  As a result, utility regulation faded to 
the margins of public policy conversations.  It became associated with 
a particular heavy-handed, monopoly-friendly, bureaucratic approach, 
which was viewed with increasing skepticism. However, the concept of 
utility regulation can be distinguished from its historical 
implementations. The rationale for distinctive treatment of utilities 
remains operative. 
 The most prominent area in which public utility regulation has 
returned to the fore is network neutrality. For years, the loudest 
debate in Internet regulation has been about “open Internet” 
obligations for broadband access providers.22  Originally, the battle 
was about the substance of FCC rules to prevent unreasonable 
blocking and discrimination.  In 2014, however, there was an 
important shift. After the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet rules for exceeding the 
proffered source of legal authority, the focus of the debate moved from 
the substance of the rules to their legal vehicle. Network neutrality 
advocates argued strenuously, and eventually successfully, that the 
FCC should reclassify broadband access under Title II of the 
Communications Act, the section governing traditional 
telecommunications carriers.23   
21 See Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1100–01 
(1930); Bruce Wyman, The Special Law Governing Public Service Corporations and All 
Others Engaged in Public Employment (1911); Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger 
Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1953); Breck P. McAllister, 
Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930). 
22 See Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535 (2009). 
23 See Lily Hay Newman, A Happy Day for Network Neutrality Advocates as FCC Votes to 
Reclassify Broadband, SLATE, (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/02/26/the_fcc_will_reclassify_broadban
d_as_a_utility_under_title_ii_so_it_can.html.  
146 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:1 
 The rallying cry of the reclassification fight was to treat broadband 
access as a public utility.24  Opponents used the same assumptions to 
attack broadband reclassification, drawing unfavorable comparisons 
to intrusive historical examples of utility regulation.25 Largely absent 
from the claims and counterclaims about “regulating the Internet as a 
public utility” was any clear sense of what that meant.  FCC Chairman, 
Tom Wheeler, argued that reclassification was merely a way to put the 
Open Internet rules on a sounder legal footing.26 By exercising its 
forbearance authority, he further claimed, the Commission would 
avoid extending most of the obligations on common carriers to 
broadband providers.27  If price regulation and other detailed 
specifications of service terms are off the table, what is left of utility 
regulation? 
 Fortunately, there are useful precedents that suggest an answer. 
The notion that emerging online services and platforms may operate 
as utilities did not originate with the current wave of Internet-enabled 
services.  The basic legal obligations of the Communications Act were 
designed with legacy communications networks, most notably the 
telephone network, in mind. However, policy makers have on multiple 
occasions considered whether similar principles might be operative 
elsewhere, for newer network-based services.   
 In the 1960s, computer scientists and the FCC recognized that the 
growth of data processing services on the telephone network gave rise 
to a new and significant sphere of activity.28  The researchers labeled 
24 See Larry Downes, How Wheeler's "Net Neutrality" Became Obama's "Public Utility", 
FORBES, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2015/02/12/how-
wheelers-net-neutrality-became-obamas-public-utility/; Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, 
F.C.C. Approves Net Neutrality Rules, Classifying Broadband Internet Service as a 
Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/technology/net-
neutrality-fcc-vote-internet-utility.html?_r=0. 
25 See L. Gordon Crovitz, A Taxi Commission for the Internet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/gordon-crovitz-a-taxi-commission-for-the-internet-
1408317784. 
26 Federal Communications Commission, Chairman Wheeler Proposes New Rules for 
Protecting the Open Internet (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-
wheeler-proposes-new-rules-protecting-open-internet; Jay Cassano, FCC Braces for Legal 
Backash Against Proposed Net Neutrality Rules, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3042164/fast-feed/fcc-braces-for-legal-backlash-against-
proposed-net-neutrality-rules. 
27 See Federal Communications Commission, supra note 26. 
28 See Werbach, supra note 17. 
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this new phenomenon the “computer utility.”29 When the FCC took up 
the issues in its Computer Inquiry proceedings, it used different 
terminology, but the concept remained the same.30 In the words of 
one prominent researcher at the time, “[the word ‘utility’] merely 
denotes a service that is shared among many users, with each user 
bearing only a small fraction of the total cost of providing that 
service.”31  Looking at networked computing platforms as utilities was 
the starting point to investigate a variety of both economic and public 
interest considerations.32 A similar analysis today would identify the 
significant areas of public policy concern that Internet-enabled 
networked services raise, where generic contract and antitrust 
principles may not provide sufficient responses.   
 This, at last, brings us to the title of this essay. Common carriage is 
a legal construct that recognizes the need to treat utilities differently.  
The category is not limited to monopoly telephone networks or even to 
communications providers.  It has been applied to stagecoaches, taxis, 
trucking, gas pipelines, and even roller coasters, cruise ships, and 
elevator operators.33  Even within federal communications law, 
common carriers are defined elliptically, leaving the boundaries of the 
category disputable. A “telecommunications carrier” is a common 
carrier if, and only if, it is providing “telecommunications services,” 
which means offering telecommunications to the public for a fee.34  
This circular definition incorporates an important concept: a common 
29 See C.C. BARNETT, JR. ET AL., B.R. ANDERSON, W.N. BANCROFT, R.T. BRADY, D.L. HANSEN, 
H. SIMMONS, D.C. SNYDER, D. WECHSLER & J.L. WILCOX, THE FUTURE OF THE COMPUTER 
UTILITY (1967); DOUGLAS PARKHILL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY (1966); 
DOUGLAS PARKHILL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY (1966); Elizabeth Fowler, 
Computer Utility Set, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1965, at 45; J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, 
The Computer as a Communication Device, SCIENCE & TECH., Apr. 1968; Paul Baran, 
Communication Policy Issues for the Coming Computer Utility (RAND Paper Series, 
Paper No. P-3685, 1968). 
30 Werbach, supra note 17. 
31 See Parkhill, supra note 29, at 3. 
32 Elsewhere, I have argued that an updated list of issues for modern-day “network 
utilities” would include connectivity, capacity and robustness, data integrity and privacy, 
and transparency. See Werbach, supra note 17. 
33 See Timothy Karr, The Biggest Lie About Net Neutrality, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 7, 
2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karr/the-biggest-lie-about-
net_b_5657250.html. 
34 47 U.S.C. § 153(51), (53) (2006). 
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carrier must hold itself out as such.  Private services are private, but if 
a company chooses to provide fee-based offerings to the public at 
large, it may take on corresponding obligations. 
 In 2014, the Maryland Public Service Commission, parsing the 
definition in its state statute, concluded that Uber was, in fact, a 
common carrier under Maryland law.35 The key requirement was that 
it “engaged in the public transportation of persons for hire.”36 Though 
Uber styles itself as a software platform used by independent drivers 
to deliver private services, its entire value proposition derives from 
operations as an Internet-enabled, coherent virtual platform.  
Whether or not the Maryland decision is upheld, it raises important 
questions.37 Public platforms that provide a significant share of 
important public services necessarily raise questions of public policy. 
The domain of common carriage is where such questions have long 
been debated.  
A NEW COMMON CARRIAGE 
 Many of the regulatory interventions historically associated with 
common carriage, intrusive rate regulation in particular, have been 
subject to sustained criticism from economists and free-market 
scholars.38  Rules that restrict companies from pricing and service 
agility introduce inefficiencies and may stand in the way of emergent 
competition. Moreover, companies subject to common carrier 
regulation typically look for ways to circumvent its burdens, distorting 
investment, and further shifting behavior away from a focus on 
35 See Maryland Public Service Commission, Investigation to Consider the Nature and 
Extent of Regulation Over the Operations of Uber Technologies, Inc. and Other Similar 
Companies, Case No. 9325 (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://webapp.psc.state.md.us/newIntranet/casenum/NewIndex3_VOpenFile.cfm?Server
FilePath=C:\Casenum\9300-9399\9325\\104.pdf; Andrew Zaleski, Welcome to the Uber 
Wars, POLITICO, Sept. 2, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/welcome-to-the-uber-wars-110498. 
36 Id.  
37 Legislation is pending in Maryland to create a new “Transportation Network Company” 
category, as in other states, which would supersede the common carrier designation. See 
Luz Lazo, Uber bill passes Maryland Senate, heads to House, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2015/04/13/uber-bill-passes-
maryland-senate-heads-to-house/. 
38 See Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an Internet-Based 
World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2013). 
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consumer benefits and innovation.  This, in turn, leads to expansion of 
the regulatory requirements to address questionable practices not 
explicitly covered before.   Eventually, when applied to then-
monopolies such as AT&T and electric utilities, common carriage was 
associated with an expansive set of obligations with little flexibility. 
 Common carriage is a fluid concept, however, not a set of 
requirements chiseled in stone.  The obligations of common carriers 
have varied by industry and time period.  In telecommunications 
today, the treatment of companies, such as Verizon, in a converged 
broadband world where competition is encouraged, differs greatly 
from the way the same title of the Communications Act was applied to 
AT&T in 1960. When adapting common carriage principles to 
emerging Internet-enabled utilities, the relevant key will be to identify 
the appropriate problems and define the appropriate responses.  
While this initial overview cannot address all the major issues, 
perhaps the two most central are non-discrimination and consumer 
protection. 
1. Non-Discrimination
 Non-discrimination is one of the core common carriage principles 
and is the central element of network neutrality.39  Like all aspects of 
common carriage, it ties into the basic bargain in which providers hold 
themselves out to serve the public and, in return, are held to standards 
to ensure they do so.  In the broadband context, non-discrimination 
concerns how access providers treat unaffiliated content and services 
that travel across their networks.  For Internet-enabled networks, the 
relevant “content and services” are, for the most part, people. 
 In most interactions in the physical world, firms and other 
organizations can choose with whom they interact.  Private contracts 
are private and, therefore, the contracting parties have absolute 
freedom in choosing their counterparties. In some situations, 
however, absolute freedom of contract enables and enshrines 
invidious discrimination such that the balance tips.  Much of civil 
rights law is based on this idea. Thus, for example, under Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, public accommodations may not 
discriminate on grounds of race.40  The rationale is similar to the 
common carriage theory that important services held out to the public 
take on special obligations.   
39 Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1270 (2008). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2011). 
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 A good example of how this may play out is Uber’s battle over 
access for the disabled.  Under the Americans With Disabilities Act 
(ADA),41 providers of public accommodations and other services are 
required to take remedial steps to make services accessible to those 
with disabilities.  So, when a customer in a wheelchair was refused 
service by an Uber driver, she sued, claiming Uber violated this 
requirement.42 Uber responded that the company itself was not 
providing any covered servicethe drivers were. In Uber’s view, it 
was merely a software provider.   
 Putting aside the specific language of the ADA, which will govern 
the resolution of the court case, the public policy issue is simple.  As a 
matter of justice and equity, people with disabilities should have 
access to essential services, so society as a whole, should internalize 
the costs to make public accommodations accessible to them. If taxi 
and limousine services are subject to the ADA, Uber’s distributed 
network of drivers should be as well.  This is especially true if, as 
seems possible, that network replaces legacy transportation providers 
as the dominant form of on-demand urban transportation.  
 It might be that the societal goal can be achieved more efficiently 
without formally placing Uber within the ADA’s mandates. Other 
discriminatory access issues involving Uber, as well as other Internet-
enabled services, may involve their own particularities.  The important 
point is that calling Uber just a software provider, by claiming it 
provides no transportation services, is a willful blindness to reality.   
 A more nuanced set of issues involves pricing. Uber, for example, 
employs “surge pricing” to raise fares during busy periods. The 
company argues this mechanism is necessary to match supply and 
demand. When drivers are scarce (either because demand is high or 
conditions such as weather make drivers stay home), the financial 
incentive of higher fares is necessary to get more of them on the road.  
Because Uber’s pricing model is not transparent, however, there is no 
way to determine how much changes in prices are necessary to 
perform this real-time optimization and how much they, instead, 
reflect rent extraction or the even less justified differentiation among 
prices charged to different riders.  The traditional response of 
41 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12117 (2000)). 
42 See Nina Strocholic, Uber: Disability Laws Don't Apply to Us, THE DAILY BEAST, May 21, 
2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/21/uber-disability-laws-don-t-
apply-to-us.html; Jen Wieczner, Why the Disabled are Suing Uber and Lyft, FORTUNE, 
May 22, 2015, http://time.com/3895021/why-the-disabled-are-suing-uber-and-lyft/. 
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common carriage law—barring any differential pricing of similarly 
situated customers—may be too extreme in these contexts.  Many 
times price discrimination is economically efficient and beneficial to 
virtually all customers. An “anything goes” approach, however, is 
equally problematic.  
2. Consumer Protection
 An often ignored aspect of common carriage is the way it operates 
to encourage appropriate care by network operators.  Historically, one 
of the foundations of common carriage is bailment law, which governs 
situations in which one person gives property to another for a limited 
purpose such as delivery.43  Old English cases held that the bailee (the 
one possessing the property) was subject to a strict liability standard, 
rather than a negligence standard, if it operated as a common 
carrier.44  One of the responsibilities of a common carrier is, thus, to 
assume responsibility for harms that occur when it provides services, 
even if not due to its own malfeasance.  In some cases, as with 
communications carriers, this obligation is removed when the 
operators are prohibited from exercising any control over the activities 
on their platforms, thus, precluding them from preventing the injury.  
Outside of such contexts, however, the broader foundation of common 
carriage is to impose greater responsibility on the carrier. 
 Uber has been involved in a number of controversies over crimes 
committed by its drivers and other situations that have resulted in 
injuries to riders.45 Similarly, Airbnb has been embroiled in 
controversy when, for example, guests robbed the homes of their 
hosts.46  In perhaps the most shocking example, a woman in India was 
43 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. 
REV. 609, 610 (1879). 
44 See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Carrier's Liability: Its History, 11 HARV. L. REV. 158 
(1897). 
45 See Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer Than Uber?, THE ATLANTIC, 
Mar. 3, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxis-safer-
than-uber/386207/; Stacy Perman, Is Uber Dangerous for Women?, MARIE CLAIRE, May 
20, 2015, http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a14480/uber-rides-dangerous-for-
women/. 
46 See Hayley Tsukayama, Airbnb Burglary Victim Says Company Tried to Quiet Her, 
WASH. POST, July 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/faster-
forward/post/airbnb-robbery-victim-says-company-tried-to-quiet-
her/2011/07/29/gIQA7R03gI_blog.html. 
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raped by an Uber driver—generating significant outcry in that country 
against Uber.47 She is now suing the company for damages in the 
United States.  
 In these cases, Uber disclaims any responsibility for drivers’ 
actions.  In Uber’s view, the drivers are independent contractors who 
own a license to Uber’s software application, not employees or 
extensions of Uber’s transportation services platform.48 Treating Uber 
as a mere software provider allows the company and its drivers a 
valuable degree of flexibility. In a sense, the drivers, rather than the 
cars, are the resource that Uber is allocating using its Internet-enabled 
platform.  The transformational aspect of its service is tied to the 
scalability and flexibility of the associated work model.  However, this 
arrangement distances Uber, which is what its users think they are 
using, from direct responsibility for their experiences.  Insurance may 
fill some of the gap, and Uber has imposed a number of voluntary 
measures to screen drivers and police their conduct.49  This may be 
sufficient in most cases, but this overall attempt at distancing does 
nothing to incentivize network providers to ensure adequate safety of 
its users.  
 In communications and Internet regulation, these types of issues 
have been addressed through two distinct responses. The law has 
created safe harbors for the platform provider, granting them 
immunity from liability for the actions of their users, so long as they 
take certain affirmative steps to police activity. Most prominently, 
47 See Nilanjanan Bhowmick, Indian Woman Sues Uber in the U.S. Over Alleged New 
Delhi Taxi Rape, TIME, Jan. 30, 2015, http://time.com/3689041/india-uber-lawsuit-new-
delhi-rape/; Dominic Rush, Delhi woman sues Uber for 'negligence and fraud' after 
alleged rape, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/29/delhi-woman-sues-uber-rape-
negligence. 
48 See Silverman, supra note 13.  Two pending California class actions are challenging this 
classification, arguing the drivers are under sufficient control of Uber to be classified as 
employees, and, thus, entitled to benefits and other protections. See Ellen Huet, Juries To 
Decide Landmark Cases Against Uber and Lyft, FORBES, Mar. 11, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/03/11/lyft-uber-employee-jury-trial-ruling/. 
The California Labor Commission recently decided that an Uber driver was an employee 
and entitled to reimbursement for costs, although five other states have reached contrary 
conclusions. See Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, 
Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-labor-ruling-
that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html. 
49 See Matthew Feeney, Is Ridesharing Safe?, CATO Institute Policy Analysis No. 767, Jan. 
27, 2015, www.memphistn.gov/Portals/0/pdf_forms/CATO.pdf. 
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Section 230 of the Communications Act and Section 512 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act define “notice and takedown” regimes for 
harmful and infringing content.50 For communications common 
carriers, stringent non-discrimination and non-interference rules that 
prohibit their interference with content also immunize them from 
liability for that content.51 
 These mechanisms recognize that the platforms cannot 
realistically be expected to preclude any improper conduct, at least not 
without destroying the very factors that make them so valuable. The 
platforms, however, should have some incentives to police their users 
and respond when violations are identified.   
 Similar safe harbors for Internet-enabled utilities might, for 
example, grant Uber protections from liability for its drivers, so long 
as it has met defined requirements for training, mandatory insurance, 
and responsiveness to accusations of improper conduct. Analogous 
structures could be developed for Internet-enabled utilities in other 
industries.  It is true that Uber has incentives to take actions of these 
kinds without regulation, in order to protect its own reputation with 
its riders. However, for a utility service, a baseline level of consumer 
protection is important. Moreover, the certainty afforded by safe 
harbor provisions can make them attractive to the platforms. Firms 
generally prefer the absence of liability guaranteed by law, rather than 
merely by a successful litigation outcome.   
 The second dimension of consumer protection is for an agency, 
most likely the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to define best 
practices and prosecute companies that deceive or mistreat their 
customers.  Over the years, the FTC has taken on significant and 
thorny issues relating to online privacy and advertising through both 
of these techniques.52 As Internet-enabled utilities become more 
significant, having enforcement and oversight mechanisms of this sort 
will grow in importance.  
50 47 U.S.C. § 230; 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
51 See Fred Cate, Telephone Companies, the First Amendment, and Technological 
Convergence, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035, 1055 (1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
612 (1977). 
52 See Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 
Recommendations For Businesses and Policymakers (Mar. 2012), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-
report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
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HOW TO GET THERE 
 If it makes sense to think of Uber and other network-enabled 
utilities as something like common carriers, how can this result be 
realized? 
 One possible path is through voluntary efforts. Companies such as 
Uber and Airbnb have taken many steps to address the kinds of issues 
discussed in this essay without any legal obligations.  Uber has an 
extensive screening process for drivers (if not the same one applied to 
taxis)53 and Airbnb has negotiated to pay hotel occupancy taxes to 
several cities where it operates.54 Some advocates of these companies 
claim that “delegated regulation” is the best way to address public 
policy concerns without stifling the entrepreneurial dynamism of 
innovative new companies.55  While there is some merit to this view, 
an attitude of “hope for the best” is rather unlikely to produce 
arrangements that resolve the major public interest concerns.  
Effective delegated regulation must be paired with some mechanisms 
to ensure adherence to baseline norms.  The essential question, 
therefore, is: What will those baseline norms be? 
 Some states, such as Illinois, have adopted legislation to define the 
regulatory obligations in certain sectors such as transportation 
services.56  These laws generally define a new category of 
Transportation Network Services (TNS) and set forth their 
obligations.  The advantage of this approach is that it makes a clean 
break from legacy services, overcoming the objection that old rules, 
built for old providers, are a poor fit for today’s new generation of 
Internet-enabled services.  The disadvantage is that it requires 
legislation, which must go through a political process that often does 
53 See Feeney, supra note 49. 
54 See Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of “Tens of Millions” to S.F., 
SFGATE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/M-R-Airbnb-
pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-6087802.php. 
55 See Emily Badger, What Happens When Uber and AirBnB Become Their Own 
Regulators, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/02/04/what-happens-when-
uber-and-airbnb-become-their-own-regulators/; Molly Cohen & Arun Sundarajaran, Self-
Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 116 (2014). 
56 See Illinois Transportation Network Providers Act, supra note 16. 
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not lend itself to rational tradeoffs.  Laws are often overly solicitous of 
both incumbents and favored new companies, and that assumes 
legislation is passed to begin with.  With many of the important issues 
situated at the state level and the variety of different industry 
categories involved, the legislative battles could number in the 
hundreds.  
 An alterative path is through regulatory agencies such as the FTC, 
which has expertise in consumer protection matters.  Indeed, the FTC 
just opened a new Office of Technology Research and Investigations,57 
but the FTC’s jurisdiction explicitly excludes common carriers.58 The 
genesis of this limitation, however, was to avoid duplication with the 
FCC, not to prevent those providers from being subject to consumer 
protection requirements.59 This division is proving to be increasingly 
awkward as the lines between common carriers and other digital 
service providers blur.   
 The FCC’s reclassification of broadband access under Title II has 
brought the issue to the fore.60  Fortunately, an examination of 
common carriage principles to illuminate the regulatory treatment of 
Internet-enabled utilities does not require a formal legal classification 
under the terms of the Communications Act.  These companies can be 
thought of as analogous to common carriers, or even classified as such 
under state laws like in Maryland,61 without placing them outside the 
reach of FTC authority.  
 Finally, the basis for heightened obligations on Internet-enabled 
utilities might come from a different source than that from which 
common carriage principles originated.  Jack Balkin and Jonathan 
Zittrain have suggested the concept of “information fiduciaries,” 
 
 
 
 
57 See Andrea Peterson, The FTC Beefs Up Technology Investigations With New Office, 
WASH. POST THE SWITCH BLOG (Mar. 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/23/the-ftc-beefs-up-
technology-investigations-with-new-office/. 
58 See Brian Fung, How to End a Fight Over Who Should Regulate Internet Providers, 
WASH. POST THE SWITCH BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/26/could-the-ftcs-
inability-to-regulate-internet-providers-come-to-an-end/. 
59 See Scott Cooper, Technology and Competition Come to Telecommunications: 
Reexamining Exemptions to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 
964-65 (1997). 
60 See id. 
61 47 U.S.C. §153(51),(53). 
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which are digital service providers subject to heightened legal duties.62  
The notion is that, just as certain professional relationships generate 
special obligations for fiduciaries, certain digital platforms occupy a 
sufficiently significant relationship to personal information that they 
should be held to a higher standard than ordinary firms.63 The 
categories of information fiduciaries and Internet-enabled services are 
not entirely coterminous, and the primary concern of Balkin and 
Zittrain is on privacy and associated concerns. So, even if the 
information fiduciary notion takes hold, it will not fully address the 
concerns raised in this essay.  It may, however, serve as a useful 
conceptual starting point.   
 As should be evident, there are many unresolved theoretical and 
practical questions for the future of Internet-enabled utility 
regulation.  Despite its lofty valuation, Uber is not yet at the scale of 
Amazon or Google, and most other companies using similar models 
are far smaller.  There is still an opportunity to consider what a 
regulatory regime for a world of Internet-enabled utilities might look 
like.   
 Science fiction author William Gibson famously declared that, “the 
future is already here—it’s just not very evenly distributed.”64 His 
aphorism is instructive for debates about Internet regulation. Too 
often, discussion centers on what services and conflicts may appear in 
the future, not on the challenges already visible today.  Alternatively 
and equally problematic, the focus is on narrow present-day questions 
that technology or market developments will soon obviate.  Internet-
enabled utilities are now in a sweet spot—they are big and successful 
enough to provide confidence in that they will be of great importance, 
but are still small and young enough to adapt as the environment 
changes. The time to consider their place in the evolving ecosystem of 
Internet regulation is now.  
 
 
 
 
 
62 See Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Mar. 
5, 2014), balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html; 
Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out, 
NEW REPUBLIC, June 1, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-
fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering. 
63 See Balkin, supra note 62. 
64 The Science in Science Fiction, NPR, Nov. 30, 1999, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1067220. 
